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Two different models for security of cryptographic protocols have
been developed: Symbolic security is an abstract notion which can
often be verified automatically. Computational security is defined in a
realistic concurrent model against arbitrary, randomized polynomial-
time attacks. A recent research trend is to prove that often, these
security notions coincide, thereby transferring the decidability results
from the abstract setting into the more realistic computational model.
Previous results in this area are only concerned with trace properties,
i.e., security goals that can be characterized as properties of single pro-
tocol runs. We prove the first equivalence result for a more complex
class of goals, which include balance for contract signing protocols.
Our result shows that computational security for these protocols can
be verified automatically. The proof relies on a careful “derandomiza-
tion” of realistic attacks.
1 Introduction
The design of cryptographic protocols is difficult and subject to many
errors—often, problems in protocols are found only years after publication.
The most famous example for this is the attack found by Gavin Lowe on a
the Needham-Schroeder authentication protocol [Low96]. To formally prove
security of cryptographic protocols, different models have been developed:
Symbolic models use abstraction from cryptographic primitives and rep-
resent messages and protocols over an algebraic structure. One of the
most prominent examples of such models is the Dolev-Yao-model [DY83],
which has been adopted and generalized for many scenarios. Security in
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these models is often decidable when considering a finite number of ses-
sions [RT03]. Decidability is sometimes preserved even when adding alge-
braic operators to the protocols, like exclusive or [CLS03] or Diffie-Hellman-
exponentiation [CKRT03, Shm04]. This allows automatic security analysis
of cryptographic protocols. The downside of these models is that while an
attack on a abstract symbolic model usually translates into an attack on a
concrete implementation, the other direction does not follow automatically:
A security proof in the symbolic model only shows that there is no attack on
the chosen level of abstraction.
Computational models (also called cryptographic models) consider pro-
tocols at the Turing machine level; principals are machines running con-
currently. Security means that no probabilistic polynomial-time adversary
can “break” the protocol with relevant probability. One of the first security
proofs in such a model was achieved by Bellare and Rogoway for mutual
authentication and key distribution in [BR93].
The security guarantees established by these types of models differ. Com-
putational models arguably give stronger security, since the adversary can be
any probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm, while in the symbolic models,
the adversary may only perform actions expressible in the algebraic model.
Also, the computational adversary can use randomness. On the other hand,
the symbolic adversary is usually modelled to be nondeterministic, or alter-
natively to have knowledge about the internal states of honest principals that
cannot be obtained by monitoring their input/output behaviour, and hence
is unavailable to the adversary in the cryptographic model.
In the present paper, we contribute to the attempt to “bridge the
gap” [AR02] between these viewpoints: We show that for a class of complex
security goals, the symbolic and computational model give the same guar-
antees. Previous work in this area has focused on trace properties, where
“bad” behaviours of protocols can be defined as properties of single execu-
tions of protocols (e.g., a security property disallows all executions where the
adversary learns a certain secret, an authentication property demands that
in any protocol run, if one party A “believes” that it has communicated with
a party B, then B “believes” that it communicated with A, etc.). Our work
deals with properties that cannot be expressed in this way. A prominent
example for a more complex requirement occurs in contract signing protocols
(see, e.g., [ASW98]). Here, a central security requirement is balance [CKS01]:
If a party A negotiates with another party B, there should not be an “un-
balanced” state where B has both a strategy to obtain a valid (i.e., signed)
contract, and another strategy that prevents A from obtaining a valid con-
tract. Such a state would allow B to enter negotiations with an outside
party C, using that B can obtain a contract with A but is not bound to the
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contract, to negotiate a better deal with C. Balance cannot be defined as a
simple trace property, since it is acceptable for a protocol run to end with
B getting a contract, and it is also admissible that there are protocol runs
where A does not get a contract. Hence both outcomes are allowed, but B
should not be able to unilaterally decide which alternative happens.
Balance can be expressed in a branching-time framework: The protocol
is not allowed to reach a point such that B can control all possible outcomes
of the protocol run. Cortier, Küsters, and Warinschi introduced a computa-
tional model for branching-time security in [CKW07], which can be used to
express balance. On the other hand, Kähler, Küsters and Wilke defined a
symbolic model allowing to express similar properties in [KKW05].
In this paper, we show that security in these two models is equivalent:
A protocol is balanced in the symbolic model if and only if it is balanced
in the computational model (the result holds for a bounded number of ses-
sions). This proves that the symbolic model is a sound abstraction of the
computational one, and most importantly implies that the decision proce-
dure from [KKW05] can be used to prove computational security. To the
best of our knowledge, this is the first result showing equivalence of symbolic
and computational security that is not limited to trace properties.
Our proof first establishes a close relationship between states of the sym-
bolic protocol and states of a system of Turing machines which realize the
protocol. We then prove a “Mapping Lemma,” which relates runs of the
protocol in both models, and is similar to techniques used in proofs for trace
properties (see [CH06]). The main difference is that our lemma deals with
a non-idealized concurrent model, and addresses cryptographic primitives
which may use randomness. The technically most intereresting part of our
result is the proof of Theorem 4.2, which uses a trade-off between nonde-
terminism and randomness to “convert” adversaries between the symbolic
and computational model: The computational adversary uses randomness
to mirror the nondeterministic decision of the symbolic adversary, with high
probability. To construct a symbolic adversary for an existing computational
one, we show that in most protocol runs, the cryptographic primitives can be
assumed to not use randomness at all. The symbolic adversary then can use
nondeterminism to deal with the remaining randomness of the computational
adversary.
Related Work: The first result relating symbolic to computational se-
curity was an influential paper by Abadi and Rogaway [AR02], who proved
equivalence for encryption-scheme security. Further results established equiv-
alence even for cases where the symbolic model is equipped with algebraic op-
erators like Diffie-Hellman exponentiation [LM05]. Equivalence results have
also been obtained in Canetti’s UC-model, which ensures computational in-
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distinguishibility in arbitrary contexts [CH06]. However, not all results have
been positive: In [BP08], Backes and Pfitzmann prove that security in stan-
dard symbolic models does not imply cryptogaphic security for protocols
using algebraic properties of exclusive or.
In [KKW05], it is explained how the ASW-protocol from [ASW98] can
be defined in the symbolic model.
2 Prerequisites
2.1 The Symbolic Model
We briefly explain the symbolic model defined in [KKW05]. As usual, mes-
sages are defined over a term algebra containing a set of variables, a set of
constants (e.g., names and random strings, also called nonces), a set of ad-
versary constants CA (nonces generated by the adversary), and a set K of
keys (all these sets are disjoint). We assume that there is a bijection (.)−1
on K that maps a public (private) key to the corresponding private (public)
key. Plain terms are defined as follows: Variables, (adversary) constants,
and keys are plain terms. If t1 and t2 are plain terms, α is a key or a nonce,
and k ∈ K, then <t1, t2> (pairing of terms), {t1}ak (asymmetric encryption
of t1 with key k), {t1}sα (symmetric encryption of t1 with key α) and sigk(t1)
(term t1 signed with respect to the public key k) are plain terms as well.
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A secure channel term is of the form sc(i, j,m), where i and j are principal
names and m is a plain term without variables. This term indicates that
the principal with name i sends a message m to the principal named j on a
secure channel, i.e., a channel that cannot be written to or blocked by the
adversary (we allow the adversary to read secure channel messages).2 These
terms may only be generated by the principal i. A term is a plain term or
a secure channel term. A (secure channel) term without variables is also
called a (secure channel) message. A (ground) substitition is a function σ
that assigns terms (without variables) to variables. We write tσ for the term
obtained from t by simultanously replacing every variable x with σ(x), for
all x in the domain of σ. A principal rule is of the form R ⇒ S, where R
is a term or ε, and S is a term. A principal Π = (V, E, r, `) is a finite tree
1Note that we only allow nonces and atomic keys as keys for symmetric encryption. If
we allow arbitrary terms, then an adversary might have partial knowledge about a key of
the form <k1, k2>
2It was shown in [PG99] that a contract signing protocol needs a trusted third party
(TTP), which usually is involved only when problems occur. Communication with the
TTP must use secure channels, otherwise the adversary can block the TTP. Hence secure
channels are necessary for contract signing protocols.
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with root r ∈ V where ` maps every edge (v, v′) ∈ E to a principal rule
`(v, v′) such that every variable occurring on the right-hand side of `(v, v′)
occurs on the left-hand side of a rule on the path from r to v′. A protocol
P = ((Π1, . . . , Πn), I0) consists of a finite set of principals and a finite set I0
of messages, the initial adversary knowledge. We require that I0 contains all
public keys and names of principals. We also require that different principals
have disjoint sets of variables, and that adversary constants do not appear
in P .
Given a set I, the adversary can derive messages as follows: d(I) is the
smallest set that contains I and all adversary constants, is closed under
pairing and splitting up pairs, symmetric and asymmetric encryption and
signature generation (if both key and message are known), and decryption
with known keys, i.e., I ∪ CA ⊆ d(I), <t1, t2>∈ d(I) if and only if t1, t2 ∈
d(I), further if t, k ∈ d(I), then {t}ak ∈ d(I), and if t1, α ∈ d(I) for a key
or nonce α, then {t1}sα ∈ d(I). Decryption and signatures are modelled as
follows: If {m}ak , k−1 ∈ d(I), then m ∈ d(I), if {t1}
s
α ∈ d(I) and α ∈ d(I),
then t1 ∈ d(I). Finally, if m, k−1 ∈ d(I), then sigk(m) ∈ d(I). Also, we
assume that both public key and message can be derived from the signature,
i.e., if sigk(m) ∈ d(I), then m, k ∈ d(I).
A symbolic state is of the form ((v1, . . . , vn), σ, I,SC), where σ is a ground
substitution, each vi is a node in Πi, I is a finite sequence of messages (the
adversary knowledge), and SC is a finite multi-set of secure channel messages,
the secure channel. We write I(q) to denote the adversary knowledge in state
q. The initial state of a protocol ((Π1, . . . , Πn), I0) is ((r1, . . . , rn), σ, I0, ∅),
where for all i, ri is the root of Πi, and σ is the substitution with the empty
domain. We now define transitions between the states. There is a transition
from a state ((v1, . . . , vn), σ, I,SC) in the following three cases (for a complete
formal definition, see [KKW05]):
Adversary Transitions The adversary can deliver a message m ∈ d(I) to
a principal Πj which has a matching outgoing edge from its current
node, i.e., an edge (vj, v
′
j) such that `(vj, v
′
j) = R ⇒ S and there is a
substitution σ′ agreeing with σ on the domain of σ such that Rσ′ = m.
In the case that there are several edges, one is picked nondeterministi-
cally. The new state of Πj is v
′
j, the new substitution is σ
′, and Sσ′ is
added to the adversary knowledge (and to the secure channel if it is a
secure channel message).
Secure Channel Delivery A message sc(i, j,m) currently in the secure
channel is removed from the secure channel and delivered to the prin-
cipal Πj, which has a matching outgoing edge in its current node (with
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respect to the current substitution σ). This is handled analogously to
the above case of an adversary-delivered message.
ε-Transitions If a principal Πj is in a state that has an outgoing edge ε ⇒ S,
then Πj can change state and send Sσ over the network or the secure
channel, where sending is as in the above two cases.
The ε-transitions are used to model the realistic ability of a party to
perform an action without being “triggered” from outside. A state can have
outgoing transitions of all three kinds. For example, in a contract signing
protocol, if a party does not receive an answer, then it can contact the trusted
third party without waiting for a new incoming message. The graph induced
by the transitions explained above is called the transition graph GP of the
protocol P . For a state q, GP,q denotes the subgraph induced by q in GP . We
call edges in GP corresponding to adversary transitions adversial edges, and
other edges scheduler edges. Finally, note that in the symbolic model, only
a finite number of interleaving sessions can be expressed.
As an example for a principal A, consider a tree with just three nodes
v1, v2, and v3, edges (v1, v2) and (v2, v3), where `(v1, v2) = ε ⇒ NA (NA
is a symbol for a nonce generated by A), and `(v2, v3) =<sigkB(Na) , x>⇒
sigkA(x) (where kA and kB are the public keys of A and B). This principal
sends out a random number, and if it receives tis number signed with B’s
public key and some other input x, it will sign x with its private key and
send the signature over the network. Hence A is willing to sign any text that
it believes to come from B (we will not address the obvious security issues
in this protocol).
2.2 The Computational Model
The computational model that we use has been defined by Cortier, Küsters,
and Warinschi in [CKW07]. Here principals are modeled as interactive Tur-
ing machines (ITMs) which, in addition to work tapes, have a tape holding
the security parameter, a tape for storing random coins, and input and out-
put tapes. The security parameter influences the strength of cryptographic
primitives. For many algorithms this is simply the bitlength of the involved
keys, and of randomly generated strings. Each I/O tape has a name, enabling
communication between machines sharing tapes with the same name. Addi-
tionally, there is an adversary machine A and a scheduler machine S (both
of these are polynomial time ITMs, the adversary may be probabilistic). All
these machines run concurrently. The runtime per activation of every ITM
in the system is polynomially bounded in the content of all tapes. To allow
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the adversary control over the network, the machines modelling principals
do not communicate directly with each other, but hand their outgoing mes-
sages to the adversary, in writing the message to a special input tape of the
adversary (the adversary machine does not necessarily get activated after
receiving a message from a principal)3. To model the secure channel, for
each pair of principal ITMs (Mi, Mj), there is a machine RC
i
j that relays
the secure channel messages sent from the principal with name i to the one
with name j. The adversary does not have write-access to the secure channel
machines (but can read messages on the secure channels as well as messages
sent over the network).
The scheduler machine is used to resolve nondeterminism, to schedule the
secure channels, and to activate the adversary. It is described in [CKW07]
as “an imaginary entity that is only needed to model how things are po-
tentially scheduled in a real protocol run”: Quantifying over all possible
schedulers is quantifying over all possible behaviours of the system with re-
gard to activation schedules, delivery schedules of the secure channel, and
non-deterministic choices of principals in symbolic protocols. When the cryp-
togtaphic system is started, control is given to the scheduler, and control is
also returned to the scheduler when a machine finishes its computation (ex-
cept when a message is delivered to a principal, this principal is activated
next). The scheduler communicates directly with the principal machines
using their I/O tapes (the adversary does not have access to the internal
behaviour of principal machines). The scheduler also controls when a secure
channel delivers the message(s) stored, and has access to the complete in-
ternal configuration of the principal machines and the adversary, including
so-far used random coins. A computational state is the configuration of all
involved Turing machines, including random coins used so far.
Note that our case is a slight simplification of the model from [CKW07]:
Their model allows to parametrize the knowledge of adversary and scheduler
with view oracles. In the current paper, we are only interested in systems
realizing symbolic protocols, we thus have to choose these view oracles re-
producing the capabilities of scheduler and adversary in the symbolic world.
Since the computational scheduler corresponds to symbolic nondeterminism,
in our setting the scheduler has complete information over the entire state of
the system (including local configuration of the principal TMs). The adver-
sary, as in the symbolic model, has access to all messages sent over network
and secure channels. With the more fine-grained approach in [CKW07],
3In the model as defined in [CKW07], there is a network buffer machine between
any two principals, these machines are controlled by the adversary. In our formulation,
we assume that messages are given directly to the adversary; this expresses that in the
symbolic protocols, messages usually do not have a uniquely specified receiver.
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it is possible to obtain slightly stronger security guarantees than the sym-
bolic model can express. On the other hand, the symbolic model as defined
in [KKW05] allows the corruption of secure channels, which is not possible
in the computational model. To introduce this in the latter, one could use
only a single secure channel machine, on which all principals (and the adver-
sary) have write-access, and ensure authenticity of messages with signatures,
where public/private keys for secure channel signatures are not used else-
where. Then corrupting the secure channel messages for some principal can
be modeled as obtaining that principal’s secure channel signature key.
3 Protocol Mapping
We now show how to execute symbolic protocols in the computational model.
In order to do this, we first introduce necessary restrictions of symbolic pro-
tocols to ensure they can be implemented in polynomial time (Section 3.1),
and then show how to implement them in such a way that the computational
system essentially has the same states as the symbolic model (Section 3.2).
In Section 3.3, we prove that the computational realization in fact closely
mirrors the behaviour of the symbolic model.
3.1 Executable Symbolic Protocols
In order to “translate” symbolic protocols to a concrete implementation us-
ing probabilistic polynomial-time Turing machines, we need to make a few
assumptions about the protocol. Syntactically, we can assume that the initial
intruder knowledge contains only a single (otherwise unused) constant sym-
bol init, and that there is a principal that, called with this constant, sends
the constant and the actual initial adversary knowledge over the network.
We can therefore identify the sequence of messages sent so far and the ad-
versary knowledge. We also require that there is a constant fail contained
in the initial adversary knowledge such that when this constant is sent to a
principal, the principal enters a mode (modeled as a subtree that is added to
every node in the original tree) where it does not accept any incoming mes-
sages from the network anymore (but does continue to accept secure channel
messages, and can perform ε-transitions).
Obviously, the cryptographic framework is in many ways more powerful
than the symbolic one, and not every cryptographic protocol has a symbolic
counterpart. On the other hand, there are also symbolic protocols which
cannot be implemented in polynomial time. We restrict ourselves to protocols
in which decryption and signature generation only is applied with keys that
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the principal “knows:” Formally, we require that each principal i has an
assigned set Ki of keys that it “owns,” i.e., has access to the corresponding
secret key (in typical Alice-and-Bob-notation, keys belonging to Bob are
often called pkB or similar). In such a protocol, a principal i may only use
rules R ⇒ S where for any term of the form {t1}ak appearing as a subterm
of R, k is a key from Ki. This expresses that asymmetric decryption is
only possible when the secret key is known, and we do not consider the
possibility that principals send their secret keys over the network (which is a
reasonable assumption). However, if they do so, then our model allows the
adversary to learn the key (if it was sent over the network unencrypted or
encrypted with keys previously learned by the adversary). For symmetric
encryption, this is different, since here keys can be sent over the network
(usually encrypted with a public key). Hence for symmetric encryption, we
demand that for a rule R ⇒ S of a principal, if R contains a subterm {t1}sx,
where x is a variable, then x must appear on the left-hand side of a previous
rule in the tree. This formalizes that in the state where the rule R ⇒ S is
applied, the principal i “knows” which key it will use to decode the message.
This condition is necessary, since otherwise a rule {x}sy ⇒ x could be used
to match with any incoming ciphertext, where the recipient learns both the
symmetric key and the message. Such a protocol is clearly not implementable
in polynomial time if the used symmetric encryption algorithm is reasonably
secure. (If a principal in a protocol is supposed to learn both a secret key
and a message encrypted with the secret key, this message can be split up
into two messages.) Similarly, if a term sigk(t) is in the right-hand term of
a rule of a principal, we demand that the principal owns the key k. Note
that these rules are sufficient to ensure that protocols can be implemented
in polynomial time, but clearly, these can be generalized (for example, one
could formalize that principals are able to “learn” secret keys for asymmetric
encryption that they recieve over the network). Our result holds for all
variants of this definition that ensure that the protocols can be executed in
polynomial time.
We call protocols that satisfy the restrictions introduced above executable
symbolic protocols.
3.2 Computational Realizations of Symbolic Protocols
In a concrete implementation, the cryptographic primitives (a signature
scheme, asymmetric and symmetric encryption, and nonce generation) have
to be instanciated with algorithms, and symbolic principals have to be sim-
ulated by Turing machines. For the realization of symbolic protocols, we fix
a signature scheme resistant against existential forgery (i.e., a polynomial-
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time adversary equipped with a signing oracle has only a negligible chance
of constructing a pair (m, s) where s is a valid signature for m that has not
been obtained from the signature oracle), and asymmetric and symmetric
encryption schemes that are IND-CCA secure (that is, when the adversary
can perform an adaptive chosen ciphertext attack, its probability of guess-
ing correctly whether some string is the encryption of a plaintext chosen
by the adversary or a random string of the same length, is only neglibibly
higher than one half). We also assume that all keys and nonces are generated
randomly and independantly of each other, and all have the same bitlength
(which depends on the security parameter).
In order to process messages from the term algebra by Turing machines,
we fix a representation of these messages as bit-strings, and assume that our
Turing machines can generate and parse this representation. The represen-
tation is as follows: We represent messages of the form {t}ak with a bitstring
that encodes a triple (aenc, k, m), where aenc is a label that specifies that
the term is the result of an asymmetric encryption, k is the public key used
for the encryption, and m is the actual bitstring obtained from calling the
encryption algorithm with the bitstring representing t and the value of k
as input. In particular, although m is a subterm of {m}ak, the bitstring
representing m is not readable from the bitstring representation of {m}ak.
This expresses that it is not possible to extract m from {m}ak without access
to k−1. Symmetric ciphertexts are modeled as pairs (senc, m), where m is
the encrypted message (obviously, there is no information about the used
key). Nonces are modeled as triples (nonce, N,m), where N is the name of
the nonce, and m is the actual randomly-generated bitstring. We deal with
signatures in a very similar way: A representation of a term sigm(k) is a bit-
string of the form (sig, k, m, s), where k is the public key, m is the bitstring
representation of the message, and s is the actual signature obtained from
the signature algorithm.
In the following, we identify representation and messages from the al-
gebra, hence our Turing machines process terms from the algebra directly.
Note however, that string representations are only unique modulo random-
ness used in the application of cryptographic primitives.
We now define the computational system that executes a given symbolic
protocol P = ((Π1, . . . , Πn), {init}): We construct the following system of
ITMs, which we call the computational realization of P .
• For each principal Πi, there is an ITM Mi (called principal machine)
that simulates Πi as follows: it maintains a current node vi in the
tree Πi and a current substitution σ. When receiving a message m
over the network or the secure channel, or the empty string (when
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activated by the scheduler without an incoming message), it determines
a matching outgoing edge (vi, v
′
i), obtaining a new substitution σ
′. Note
that matching may include signature verification and decryption. In
the case that there are several matching edges, one is picked with help
of the scheduler (which communicates with principals directly using
their I/O tapes). Now Mi hands the string representation of Sσ
′ to a
secure channel machine and/or the adversary, depending on whether
Sσ′ is a secure channel message or not. To compute the representation
of Sσ′, cryptographic primitives may be called, including generating a
random number when a nonce symbol appears for the first time. The
new current state of the principal is v′i, its new current substitution
is σ′. If an incoming message cannot be matched, then Mi from now
on ignores all adversary-delivered messages, but still accepts messages
from the secure channel and ε-messages from the scheduler.4
• Secure Channel machines: For each pair (Πi, Πj) of principals, we in-
troduce a secure channel machine RCij which acts as described in Sec-
tion 2.2.
With P (A,S), we denote the computational realization of P when run
with adversary A and scheduler S, where the cryptographic primitives satisfy
the above-mentioned security requirements. Note that if P is an executable
symbolic protocol, A is a probabilistic polynomial-time adversary, and S
a polynomial-time scheduler, then P (A,S) runs in probabilistic polynomial
time in the security parameter: In computational realizations of symbolic
protocols, each ITM is activated a constant number of times only, and the
length of the messages is bounded by a polynomial in the security parameter.
We now establish a correspondance between symbolic and computational
states. The configuration of an (inactive) principal machine is determined
by its current node and substitution. The scheduler has access to the con-
figuration of all machines, and does not have a relevant configuration on its
own. Hence, a computational state is defined by:
• Current node and substitution of the principal machines,
4This behaviour mirrors the symbolic fail command introduced earlier. We require
this, since otherwise a computational adversary can learn something from the fact that a
message was not accepted, and get partial information about the keys. More formally, if
the principal would continue its operation after recieving a non-matchable message, the
computational realization would not realize the protocol with graph GP , but a protocol
which extends GP with certain self-loops. In particular, in such a protocol an unbounded
number of principal actions can be performed, which is a significant difference to the
protocols in the symbolic model.
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• sequence of messages sent so far by the principals,
• messages stored in the secure channel machines,
• randomness used by the principals and the adversary,
• local configuration of the adversary machine.
For a fixed choice of randomness used so far, the encoding of a message
as a bitstring is unique. Hence the state in the above sense is uniquely deter-
mined if we consider the messages sent and on the secure channel as terms
from the term algebra. The adversary state is uniquely determined by the
system properties observable by the adversary, i.e., its initial configuration,
adversary randomness used so far, and replies sent by the principals (as reac-
tion to message or secure channel delivery). Hence the last item in the above
list is redundant, the computational state is uniquely determined by the first
four. The first three of these directly constitute a symbolic state (since each
principal uses different variables, the local substitutions of each principal
correspond to a unique global substitution). We say that two computational
states are equivalent if they only differ in the random coins used by principals
and adversary, and identify symbolic states and equivalence classes of compu-
tational states. We write elements of the equivalence class corresponding to
the symbolic state q as pairs (q,−→r ), where −→r is the sequence of random coins
used in the computational realization up to that state. Note that not every
state (q,−→r ) is consistent: The randomness −→r might make the adversary A
choose a strategy that never reaches a state from the class q. We will ignore
this technicality, and when we say “a randomly chosen state from the class
q,” we mean a state of the form (q,−→r ) that is consistent, i.e., such that there
is a scheduler S such that when P (A,S) is started and the random coins
used by the principals and the adversary are −→r , then the protocol reaches a
state from the class q.
A run of the computational realization P (A,S) induces a sequence of
vertices in GP : A step in such a run is the (scheduler-triggered) action of
either a secure channel machine, the adversary, or a principal (with an ε-
transition), plus the following action of the involved principal. After the
principal has finished its computation (with sending a reply message), control
is returned to the scheduler and the protocol is in a well-defined symbolic
state. Note however, that a step (q1, q2) in the execution of P (A,S) is not
necessarily an edge in GP , since the computational adversary can perform
actions not available to the symbolic one. However, we will show in the
following Lemma 3.1 that, with overwhelming probability, the steps in an
execution of P (A,S) do correspond to edges in GP .
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3.3 Mapping Protocol Executions
The proof of the following lemma uses similar ideas to other proofs for related
results, see e.g., [CH06]. The main difference is that our lemma states a result
about a concrete computational model, and not about a hybrid model using
ideal functionalities. As a consequence, we handle randomness directly in
the proof of the lemma. Note that this proof is the only place where we
actually need the security properties of our cryptographic primitives—this
is not surprising, since we only need these to ensure that the adversary in
the computational model is not more powerful than the one in the symbolic
model.
Lemma 3.1 Let P be an executable symbolic protocol, let A be an adversary,
and S be a scheduler. Then with overwhelming probability, every step (q1, q2)
in a run of P (A,S) started in a randomly chosen state from an equivalence
class q is an edge in GP .
Proof. First note that when considering computational realizations of sym-
bolic protocols, we can restrict ourselves to schedulers that behave correctly
in a syntactic way: We assume that a scheduler only delivers messages from
secure channels to principals that, in their current state, can match these
message with an applicable rule. This restriction is justified as follows: Since
the scheduler has complete knowledge of the principal machines, it knows be-
fore delivering a message whether the principal will be able to match it. The
scheduler does not gain anything from deliberately sending a non-matching
message to the principal, since this cannot make the principal simulating the
symbolic protocol change its state. Hence the only consequence of such a
delivery would be that the message is removed from the current set of se-
cure channel messages. Since the scheduler always has the option to never
deliver a message on the secure channel, leaving the message on the secure
channel does not limit its abilities. Similarly, the scheduler does not have
any reason to send ε-messages to participants who do not have an outgoing
ε-transition in the current state, hence we only consider schedulers which
do not do this. Note that we cannot make a similar restriction for the ad-
versary, since the adversary does not have access to the internal state of
principal machines, and hence can gain information by observing whether
an incoming message has been accepted. Deliveries by the adversary which
cannot be matched will be dealt with by using the fail command in the
symbolic model and the corresponding behaviour of the computational real-
ization as introduced in Section 3.2. One could also make the principals treat
an incoming “unmatchable” message on the secure channel in the same way
as an incoming message from the adversary that cannot be matched, i.e., let
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the principals go into a special state where some messages (either network or
scheduler messages) are not accepted anymore. However, this is not natural
in the models we consider: If the scheduler could, via delivering an unmatch-
able secure channel message, stop the principals from accepting adversary
(network) messages in the future, this would give too much power to the
scheduler: The purpose of the scheduler is to schedule the ordering of events
that happen in the protocol, not to “disable” participants. (If one wants
to equip the scheduler with such a power, this can be obtained by adding
corresponding ε-transitions to the protocol principals). For the other alter-
native, there is no point in allowing the scheduler to make a principal go into
a state where it does not accept incoming scheduler messages anymore—the
scheduler can achieve the same effect by simply not delivering such messages
to the principal in question anymore. Hence the only natural choice for our
model is to assume that unmatchable messages from the secure channel do
not have an effect on the principals, and thus, as explained above, we can
assume that these events do not occur.
For the proof of the lemma, let −→r1 ,−→r2 be the randomness used by the
principals and the adversary in the computational system in the computation
up to states q1 and q2, i.e., let the computational states corresponding to q1
and q2 be (q1,
−→r1 ) and (q2,−→r2 ), respectively. We make a case distinction
depending on which action (triggered by the scheduler) lead from (q1,
−→r1 ) to
(q2,
−→r2 ) in the execution of P (A,S).
Case 1: Secure Channel machine Assume that the action between
(q1,
−→r1 ) and (q2,−→r2 ) was the delivery of a secure channel message m
to some principal with name i. As explained above, we can assume
that the principal was able to match the message with a rule applica-
ble in its current state. Hence for its current node vi and the current
substitution σi, there exists an edge (vi, v
′
i) such that `(vi, v
′
i) = R ⇒ S,
and there is a substitution σ′i, which agrees with σi on the domain of
the latter, such that Rσ′i = m, and Sσ
′
i is the message sent over the
network or the secure channel by Mi. Thus q2 is obtained from q1 by
the principal with name i changing its current node to v′i, extending
its substitution to σ′i, removing m from the secure channel, and adding
Sσ′i to the adversary knowledge (and potentially the secure channel).
This is an action also allowed by the symbolic protocol, and thus there
is an edge (q1, q2) in GP as required.
Case 2: Principal machine without incoming message Assume that
the principal i was activated by the scheduler machine, without an
incoming message. Since we only consider schedulers which send ε-
messages only to principals expecting them, the current node vi of the
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principal i has an outgoing edge (vi, v
′
i) such that `(vi, v
′
i) is of the form
ε ⇒ S, where Sσi is the message that i sent over the network, and σi
is the current substitution of the principal i. Thus q2 is obtained by
the principal i changing its current node to v′i, and adding Sσi to the
adversary knowledge (and the secure channel, if it is a secure channel
message). This is a valid action in the symbolic protocol, and hence
there is an edge (q1, q2) in GP .
Case 3: Activation of the adversary Now assume that the adversary
was activated, and it delivered a message m to the principal i. First
assume that the principal could not match the incoming message with
an applicable role. By the definition of the computational realization,
this means that the principal machine changed into a mode where it
does not accept messages from the adversary anymore. The same ef-
fect can be achieved by the symbolic adversary by sending the special
constant fail to the principal as introduced in Section 3.1. Hence in
this case, there is an edge (q1, q2) in GP as claimed. Now assume that
the principal was able to match the message m in the tree Πi. The
proof of this case is identical to the case of a secure channel message
above, except that we need to show that the delivered message m is an
element of d(I(q1)), i.e., that the symbolic adversary is able to derive
the message that the computational adversary sends. We show that
the case m /∈ d(I(q1)) occurs only with negligible probability.
In order to prove this, we first show that A has only negligible propa-
bility of producing the bitstring representation of a nonce or a key that
it cannot derive from its current knowledge. For this, we say that the
computational adversary A can access a key or a nonce α in a state
(q,−→r ), if it has a probability of distinguishing α from a random string
of the same length that non-neglibibly exceeds one half (remember that
all keys and nonces have the same bitlength, which depends on the se-
curity parameter). We now show the following claim, which proves that
a key or a nonce that is secret in the symbolic model is also secret in
the computational model.
Claim Let α be a key or a nonce which is not an element of d(I(q))
in a state q. Then A cannot access α in a randomly chosen state from
the class q.
Proof. of the claim We first introduce some additional notation. We
say that a set S of keys and nonces reveals a key or a nonce α in a
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state q, if α ∈ d(I(q) ∪ S), and S is a minimal set with this property.
In particular, this implies S ∩d(I(q)) = ∅. Note that S is not uniquely







{k1} and {k2} reveal α in q. We say that α is secret in a state q if
α /∈ d(I(q)) (this is equivalent to asking that ∅ does not reveal α). For
two secret keys or nonces α and β, we write β →q α if there is a set
S such that S reveals α in q, and β ∈ S, i.e., if the knowledge of β
“helps” the adversary to obtain α. Note that → is a reflexive relation.
We further define the relation ³ to be the transitive closure of →, and
let ≤ be the partial order defined on the equivalence classes induced
by ³.
Now assume that the claim does not hold. Then let β be a ≤-minimal
key or nonce such that β ≤ α, and A can access β (in particular, due
to the notation introduced above, this implies that β is secret). Since
β ≤ a only holds for a finite number of keys and nonces β, and α
itself satisfies the conditions except for the minimality, such a minimal
β exists. Due to the definitions of the relations above, it follows that
β was only sent over the network encrypted with keys that A cannot
distinguish from random noise. Hence if A can distinguish β from
random noise, A has won the IND-CCA-game against the encryption
scheme. This is a contradiction, since due to our prerequisites, both
the asymmetric and the symmetric encryption scheme are IND-CCA-
secure. ¤
With this property, we can now finish the proof of Lemma 3.1. As
mentioned above, it remains to prove that the case m /∈ d(I(q1)) occurs
only with negligible probability. Hence assume that m /∈ d(I(q1)). Let
R ⇒ S be the rule chosen by the principal Πi on receiving the message
m, and let σ′ be the substitution obtained by the matching. Since
Rσ′ = m, we know that in particular, m is a bitstring representing a
message from the term algebra. Hence we can regard m as a tree in
the algebra. Let v be a node in m such that v /∈ d(I(q1)) (we identify
v with the term it represents), but all successors of v (corresponding
to subterms of v) are members of this set. We make a case distinction.
First consider the case that v is a leaf, i.e., a constant, and assume
that v has not been transferred over the network. Since names of
the principals are public (and hence have been transferred over the
network in the initialization phase generating the initial knowledge of
the adversary), this constant must be a nonce which is not an adversary
constant. Hence the adversary has successfully guessed a nonce created
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by a principal, this event only happens with negligible probability. Now
assume that v has been transferred over the network. Since v /∈ d(I(q)),
due to the above claim, A has a chance that is negligibly better than
one half to distinguish v from a random string. In particular, the
probability that A generates v is negligible.
Now consider the case that v is not a leaf. If v represents the pairing of
two terms, then we have a contradiction, because by choice of v, both
successors of v are elements of d(I(q1)), and this set is closed under
the pairing operator. Now assume that v is the asymmetric encryption
{t}ak of a term t under a key k. Due to the choice of v, it follows that
both t and k are elements of d(I(q1)), and thus {t}ak is also an ele-
ment of d(I(q1)), a contradiction. Now assume that v is the symmetric
encryption {t1}sα of a message t1, with the key or nonce α used as a
symmetric encryption key. Due to the minimality of v, we know that
both t1 and α are elements of d(I(q1)). Since d(I(q1)) is closed under
symmetric encryption, it follows that v ∈ d(I(q1)), a contradiction.
Finally assume that the subterm at v is of the form sigk(t) for a term
t and a key k. Since all successors of v are elements of d(I(r1)), and
t is a subterm of sigk(t), it follows that k
−1 /∈ d(I(q1)) (otherwise, v
would be an element of d(I(q1))). Hence k−1 is secret in q1, and due
to the above claim, the adversary’s chance of distinguishing k−1 from
random is neglibibly better than one half. Thus A has constructed a
correct signature without access to the private key—since the signature
scheme is resistant against existential forgery, this only happens with
negligible probability.
Hence all cases where m /∈ d(I(q1)) occur with negligible probability,
and therefore m ∈ d(I(q1)) with overwhelming probability, as claimed. This
finishes the proof of the lemma. ¤
The above lemma ensures that, with overwhelming probability, a run of
the computational system induces a path in the protocol graph GP . One
consequence of this result is that with overwhelming probability, the com-
putational adversary does not “break” the cryptographic primitives. Hence
we can restrict ourselves to adversaries that do not even attempt that. In
the face of such an adversary, the strength of the implementation of the
cryptographic primitives becomes irrelevant. In particular, this allows us to
exchange the implementation of the cryptographic primitives with one that
does not use randomness at all, without giving more power to the adversary.
Hence we can fix one choice of random coins for the principals, and thus each
equivalence class of computational states only contains a single state (ex-
cept that we need to be careful about the randomness used by the adversary
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outside of cryptographic primitives, e.g., to randomly decide which symbolic
step to perform). We therefore obtain a real bijection between the states of
the symbolic and of the computational system. This idea is formalized in the
proof of Theorem 4.2.
4 Branching-Time Behaviour
We now show that the computational realization of symbolic protocols fulfill
the same security requirements as their symbolic counterparts. Section 4.1
covers the “reachability” part of the result, Section 4.2 then proves that
strategies can be transformed from one model to the other.
4.1 Reachability
We now state the first part of our transfer result, which concerns the case of
reachability: A protocol can reach a state q in the symbolic model if and only
if this state can be reached in the computational model with non-negligible
probability. This first part is similar to previous results on trace properties:
For example, the question whether a protocol preserves secrecy of a value can
be phrased as the question whether some state (or set of states) is reachable.
We first define what we mean with “reachable,” in the computational and in
the symbolic model:
Definition Let P = ((Π1, . . . , Πn), I) be a protocol, and let q1 and q2 be
states of P . We say that
• q2 is symbolically reachable from q1 in P if there is a path from q1 to q2
in GP ,
• q2 is computationally reachable from q1 in P if there are an adversary
A and a scheduler S such that when P (A,S) is started in a randolmy
chosen state from q1, the probability of it reaching a state in q2 is
non-negligible (in the security parameter).
We now show that these reachability notions are equivalent. The result
easily follows from the previous Lemma 3.1, which already established that
runs of the symbolic protocol and its computational realization coincide with
overwhelming probability.
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Theorem 4.1 Let P be a protocol, and let q1 and q2 be states in GP . Then
q2 is computationally reachable from q1 in P if and only if q2 is symbolically
reachable from q1 in P .
Proof. First assume that q2 is symbolically reachable from q1 in P . We
construct an adversary A and a scheduler S such that when P (A,S) is
started in a state (q1,
−→r1 ), the probability of reaching a state from the class
q2 is non-negligible (where
−→r1 is chosen randomly).
We define A and S as basically “mimicing” the path from q1 to q2 that
exists in GP . This means that at each state on the path in GP , depending
on the next edge in the path, either the scheduler activates the adversary,
which delivers a message (and the scheduler makes the principal choose the
matching edge corresponding to the path in GP , if there is more than one
choice), the scheduler triggers the delivery of a secure channel message, or
of an ε-transition of a principal (i.e., it activates a principal without an
incoming message). Since on the path in GP , all adversary-sent messages are
elements of the current adversary knowledge, the polynomial-time adversary
can compute all these messages. Note that since adversary and scheduler
follow a symbolic path, the randomness used by principals and adversary does
not influence the success probability of the adversary: The adversary does
not “guess” a message which he does not have access to, or forge signatures
without having the corresponding secret key. Therefore, the adversary and
the scheduler do not have to make any random choices (since the path from
q1 to q2 is finite, the exact sequence of actions to perform can be hard-
coded into the algorithms A and S). Hence we can identify symbolic and
computational states. In particular, since the symbolic protocol reaches the
state q, the computational realization reaches a state of the form (q2,
−→r2 ) with
probability 1. In particular, q2 is computationally reachable from q1 in P .
Now assume that q2 is computationally reachable from q1 in P , i.e., there
is an adversary A and a scheduler S such that for a randomly chosen vector
−→r1 , when P (A,S) is started in (q1,−→r1 ), the probability of reaching a state
from the class q2 is non-negligible. We show that there is a path from q1 to
q2 in GP . From Lemma 3.1, we know that with overwhelming probability,
the sequence of states visited by the run of P (A,S) corresponds to a path in
GP . Hence there must be such a path from q1 to q2 in GP , as claimed. ¤
4.2 Strategies
In the previous section, we have seen that reachability is equivalent in the
computational and the symbolic models, i.e., an adversary (with the help of
a scheduler) can reach a state in one model if and only if it can do this in the
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other. For security properties of protocols that rely on the set of reachable
states alone (like secrecy or mutual authentication), this is enough to show
that security in the symbolic and in the computational model coincide. In
the case of more complex security properties that we are interested here, this
is not sufficient: We have to prove that reaching a state is as “useful” to
the adversary in the computational model as it is in the symbolic one. In
the case of contract signing protocols, this means that we want to show that
a state is “unbalanced” (cp. Introduction) symbolically if and only if it is
unbalanced computationally. For contract signing protocols, there are two
goals that the adversary wants to be able to reach: Having a contract himself,
and preventing another principal from obtaining a contract. More generally,
a goal is a pair (C, C ′), where C and C ′ are sets of atoms. A symbolic state
q satisfies (C, C ′), if C ⊆ d(I(q)), and C ′ ∩ d(I(q)) = ∅. In the example of
contract signing protocols, one can specify the protocol in such a way that a
special nonce is sent over the network (by the principal or the trusted third
party) when a principal or the adversary obtains a contract. Hence goals like
“the adversary obtains a contract” or “the principal i does not have a valid
contract” can be defined in this way.
For a state q in the protocol P and a goal (C, C ′), a symbolic q-strategy
for (C, C ′) in P is a subgraph H of GP,q obtained by removing adversial
edges and nodes then unreachable from q such that every leaf in H satisfies
(C, C ′). Intuitively, such a strategy tells the symbolic adversary which action
to perform in each state. We are only interested in leaves here, because the
adversary has only achieved a goal of the form “a principal does not have a
valid contract” if that principal cannot obtain the contract anymore in the
protocol run (otherwise such a goal would always be reached at the beginning
of a protocol). Since we only remove adversial edges, a leaf in H is a state
in which no principal can perform an ε-transition, or receive a message from
the secure channel anymore. The only party that still can perform an action
is the adversary, and the strategy H might tell the adversary not to do so.
Hence it is allowed to have leaves in H which are no leaves in GP .
In the computational world, a strategy is also a “set of instructions” for
the adversary. Unlike in the first phase of the protocol where the adversary
tries to reach a certain state with the help of the scheduler, a computational
strategy has to work against all possible schedulers, that is, for all possible
non-deterministic choices of the principals, and all possible schedules of the
secure channel messages. Formally, we say that a computational q-strategy
for (C, C ′) in P is an adversary A such that for every scheduler S, the
probability that P (A,S), when started in a randomly chosen state from the
class q, ends in a state satisfying (C, C ′) is non-negligible.
Again, we do not require the protocol to end in a leaf of GP , due to the
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same reason as above: The adversary might choose not to perform an action
anymore, although it could (like delivering a signed contract to a principal).
Since we demand that the protocol run ends in a state satisfying the goal for
all schedulers, this implies that no principal has an outgoing ε-transition, and
no secure channel message can be delivered that makes the protocol reach
a state not satisfying the goal, i.e., the principals and the schedulers cannot
perform any relevant action anymore. Note that in [CKW07], the issue of
how to ensure that every principal who still wants to perform an action has
the opportunity to do so was adressed by using fair schedulers. Since in the
current paper, we are interested only in procotols which induce a transition
graph of finite depth, it suffices to restrict ourselves to nodes that do not
have outgoing scheduler edges (since these are exactly those states in which
none of the principals can still “take an action” in the sense of [CKW07]—
again, the adversary might choose not to perform an action if it has achieved
the goal in the current state). Also note that in the mentioned paper, goals
were described by polynomial-time functions from the configurations of the
involved Turing machines. It is easy to see that for the class of protocols we
consider here, these notions of goals are equally expressive.
The fact that a state allows a stragegy for some goal is not considered
harmful for a security protocol, since these goals might very well be some
that the protocol is supposed to obtain (for example, in a contract signing
protocol, every leaf where a principal obtained a contract also has a (trivial)
strategy for that principal to obtain the contract). What a protocol should
avoid is for a state to allow strategies for two different goals, since this would
allow the adversary to unilaterally determine the outcome of a protocol. We
call states which allow such strategies unbalanced with respect to a set of
goals.
Formally, we say that a symbolic state q in the protocol P is (compu-
tationally or symbolically) unbalanced for a set of goals G, if for every goal
(C, C ′) in G, there is a (computational or symbolic) q-strategy for (C, C ′) in
P . It can easily be verified that this definition of computational unbalanced-
ness is equivalent to the definition of unfairness in [CKW07]. We show the
following theorem:
Theorem 4.2 Let P be a protocol, and G a set of goals. Then a state q
in P is symbolically unbalanced for G if and only if it is computationally
unbalanced for G.
Proof. Clearly it suffices to show that there is a symbolic q-strategy for a
goal (C, C ′) in P if and only if there is a computational q-strategy for (C, C ′)
in P .
23
First assume that there is a symbolic strategy H. The computational
strategy we construct simply mimics the symbolic one, which can be done
since all messages sent by the symbolic adversary can be obtained from the
messages sent by the honest principals in polynomial time. To be more for-
mal, in a symbolic state q which is not a leaf, the computational adversary
chooses (arbitrarily) one of the edges available in H, and sends the corre-
sponding message (which it can derive from its current knowledge, since H
is a subgraph of GP ). When the protocol reaches a leaf, this state satisfies
(C, C ′) due to the choice of H. It only remains to prove that the adversary
can always guess the correct equivalence class of the current state of the
protocol with high probability.
In order to prove this, note that if the adversary follows a fixed strategy,
then the relevant part of the protocol graph GP is only finitely branching,
since the principals only have a finite number of nondeterministic choices in
each step. Since the number of steps executed is bounded by a constant, the
adversary can guess in each stage of the execution which of the (finitely many)
possible symbolic states the execution is in. Since there are only finitely many
guesses that the adversary needs to perform, and it has a non-negligible
probability of guessing correctly in each step, the probability that it guesses
correctly every time—and thus follows the symbolic strategy H correctly,
thereby reaching a leaf satisfying the goal (C, C ′)—is non-negligible. Hence
the adversary A constructed in this way is a computational q-strategy for
the goal (C, C ′) in P .
Now assume that there is a computational q-strategy for (C, C ′) in P ,
i.e., an adversary A such that for all schedulers S, the system P (A,S),
when started in a randomly chosen state of the form (q,−→r ), reaches a leaf
satisfying (C, C ′) with non-negligible probability for all possible schedulers
S. From Lemma 3.1, we know that with overwhelming probability, every
step in a protocol run of P (A,S) corresponds to an edge in GP . This implies
that the adversary can be replaced with one that does not attempt to guess
a nonce created by the principals or decrypt a message where the decryption
key is not available to the adversary, or forge a signature without access to the
secret key, and this adversary still has non-negligible success probability. In
particular, this means that the success probability of the adversary does not
depend on the implementation of the cryptographic primitives used by the
principals. Hence we can replace this implementation with one that does not
use randomness, without changing the success probability of the adversary.
We can therefore assume that only the adversary uses randomness.
We say that a state (v,−→rv ) is (C, C ′)-enabling if when P (A,S) is started
in (v,−→rv ), the probability of ending in a leaf satisfying (C, C ′) is nonzero
for all possible schedulers. In particular, due to the choice of q, there is a
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randomness vector −→rq such that (q,−→rq ) is (C, C ′)-enabling. We define the
symbolic strategy H by defining a series of subgraphs {Hi}n∈N of GP,q. We
will also define, for every state v in ∪iHi, a suitable randomness vector −→rv
such that the state (v,−→rv ) is (C, C ′)-enabling. For i = 0, −→rq has been defined
above. Now assume inductively that Hi and −→rv for all v ∈ Hi, have been
defined with this property. We construct the next partial strategy Hi+1 in
two steps: We first add scheduler edges, and in a second step add adversial
edges. Since we want to construct a symbolic strategy, we need to add all
possible scheduler successors, but can choose which of the adversial actions
to add.
For this, let H′i be the graph obtained from Hi by adding all symbolic
states that can be reached from a state in Hi in GP using only scheduler
edges, and the scheduler edges leading to these vertices. For every state
v′ in H′i \ Hi, let the corresponding randomness vector −→rv′ be the same as
the randomness from one of the states in Hi from which v can be reached
using only scheduler edges. We show that for every node v′ ∈ H′i, the state
(v′,−→rv′) is (C, C ′)-enabling. Let v′ be a node from H′i. By choice of v′ and−→rv′ , v′ can be reached from some node v in Hi for which −→rv′ = −→rv , on a
path from v to v′ which uses only scheduler edges. Therefore, there exists a
scheduler Sv′ which follows this path, i.e., when P (A,Sv′) is started in (v,−→rv ),
the execution reaches a state from the class v′. Due to the above, only A
uses randomness. Hence no random choices have been made between v and
v′, and therefore, the execution reaches the state (v′,−→rv ). Since (v,−→rv ) is
(C, C ′)-enabling, the probability of P (A,S) reaching a leaf satisfying (C, C ′)
when started in (v,−→rv ) with an arbitrary scheduler S (including Sv′) is non-
zero. Since no random choices were made between v and v′, the adversary
A still has non-negligible probability of reaching a goal satisfying (C, C ′)
when the computational realization of P is started with any scheduler and
A in state (v′,−→rv ). Hence we can define −→rv′ = −→rv , and (v′,−→rv ) = (v′,−→rv′) is
(C, C ′)-enabling as required.
In the second step, we add the adversary actions (and here we have a
choice which successors to add). First define Si to be the set of leaves in H′i.
We will define a function fi : Si → GP,q, which defines, for each s ∈ Si, which
successor fi(s) (representing the adversarial action to be taken in that state)
to add in the next step. First assume that the symbolic state s ∈ Si satisfies
(C, C ′). Since s is a leaf in H′i, this implies that s does not have any outgoing
scheduler-edges in GP,q. Hence the suitable strategy for the adversary is to
do nothing, and remain in this state. We therefore define fi(s) = s. Now
assume that s does not satisfy (C, C ′). Since (s,−→rs ) is (C, C ′)-enabling, it
follows that s has a descendant in GP which satisfies (C, C ′). In particular, s
is no leaf in (C, C ′). Since s is a leaf inH′i, andH′i contains all of the outgoing
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scheduler edges for all nodes it contains, we know that all outgoing edges of s
in GP are adversial edges. Due to the construction ofH′i, we know that (s,−→rs )
is (C, C ′)-enabling. In particular, there is an adversial action that As can
perform in the state (s,−→rs ) such that when reaching the successor state s′, it
still has a non-zero success probability against all schedulers. Since s does not
satisfy (C, C ′), we can choose s′ with s 6= s′. Let −→rs′ be the random choices
from −→rs extended with the random choice that makes A perform the action
leading to s′. Then, P (A,S) still has non-zero probability of reaching a leaf
satisfying (C, C ′) when started in (s′,−→rs′) for all schedulers S, i.e., (s′,−→rs′)
is (C, C ′)-enabling. Note that due to the comments earlier, we can restrict
ourselves to adversaries that only perform actions present in GP . Hence there
is an edge (s, s′) ∈ GP . We define fi(s) = s′.
Note that by the above, for all s ∈ Si, we have that (f(s),−−→rf(s)) is (C, C ′)-
enabling. By construction, this is also true for all (s,−→rs ) for s ∈ H′i. Therefore
we can define Hi+1 as having all vertices from H
′
i ∪ {f(s) | s ∈ Si}, and all
edges from H′i, plus all edges of the form (s, fi(s)), where s is an element of
Si and fi(s) 6= s. In this way, we have ensured that for every state v ∈ Hi+1,
(v,−→rv ) is (C, C ′)-enabling. Hence Hi+1 satisfies the required properties.
By construction, in the step from Hi to Hi+1 each path is either extended
by at least one node, or will not be extended in any future step. Since all
paths in GP are finite, there is some i such that Hi = Hi+1. We define
H = Hi, and claim that H is a symbolic strategy for (C, C ′). We first need
to show that H is obtained from GP,q by removing only adversial edges and
vertices unreachable from q. Assume that this is not the case, then there
is a vertex v ∈ H and an edge (v, v′) in GP \ H which is not an adversarial
edge, i.e., a scheduler edge. This is a contradiction, since H = Hi+1 = Hi,
and since Hi ⊆ H′i ⊆ Hi+1, it also follows that H = H′i. The latter is closed
under adding successors reachable on paths using only scheduler edges, hence
(v, v′) is an edge in H′i = H, a contradiction.
It remains to show that every leaf in H satisfies the goal (C, C ′). Let s
be a leaf in H. Due to the construction, we know that s is an element of Si.
Since s is a leaf in H, we know that fi(s) = s, since otherwise, there is an
edge (s, fi(s)) in Hi+1 = H = Hi. Due to the construction, fi(s) = s only
happens in the case that s satisfies (C, C ′). Hence every leaf of H satisfies




In the previous section, we have shown that the computational realization
of a symbolic protocol P in fact shares (with overwhelming probability) the
most important properties of P . This immediately implies that a protocol
is “secure” symbolically if and only if it is “secure” computationally, in the
following formal way: We say that a protocol P is (computationally or sym-
bolically) unbalanced with respect to a set G of goals if there is a state q that
is (computationally or symbolically) unbalanced with respect to G and that
is (computationally or symbolically) reachable from the starting state of P .
From the results in the previous sections, we obtain the following:
Corollary 5.1 An executable symbolic protocol P is symbolically unbalanced
if and only if it is computationally unbalanced.
As far as we know, this result is the first result showing that a security
property transfers from the symbolic to the computational world which is not
a trace property. One of the most important applications of our result (and
results that prove equivalence of secutrity in symbolic and computational
models in general) is that decidability directly transfers from the symbolic
case. Since decidability of symbolic unbalancedness was proven in [KKW05],
we immediately obtain the following:
Corollary 5.2 The question if an executable symbolic protocol is computa-
tionally unbalanced is decidable.
There are many interesting directions for future research. An obvious
open question is how to generalize our results to a richer class of protocols
(e.g., recursive protocols as introduced in [Tru05]) and to an unbounded num-
ber of seesions. Security analysis of symbolic protocols becomes undecidable
in this [DLMS04], but by over-approximations the adversary knowledge, au-
tomatic analysis of protocols might still be possible, with techniques similar
as in [RK06]. Other interesting topics involve the handling of more cryp-
tographic primitives, for example private contract signatures as introduced
in [GJM99]. To incorporate these into our result, note that the only element
of our proof that needs to be generalized is the proof of Lemma 3.1. Finally,
it would be very interesting to consider more complex security goals, and
study a uniform way to express them in—one candidate is a variant of ATL,
used to describe properties of contract-signing protocols in [Käh08].
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